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Abstract:  
 
Can phenomenological evidence play a decisive role in accepting or rejecting social cognition 
theories? Is it the case that a theory of social cognition ought to explain and be empirically 
supported by our phenomenological experience? There is serious disagreement about the 
answers to these questions. This paper aims to determine the methodological role of 
phenomenology in social cognition debates. The following three features are characteristic of 
evidence capable of playing a substantial methodological role: novelty, reliability, and relevance. 
I argue that phenomenological evidence lacks all three criteria and, consequently, should not 
play a substantial role in debates about social cognition.  	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  Social	  cognition	  is	  our	  ability	  to	  understand	  and	  interact	  with	  other	  agents.	  It	  is	  a	  ubiquitous	  feature	  of	  our	  lives.	  Talking	  to	  a	  colleague,	  driving	  on	  a	  busy	  freeway,	  teaching,	  and	  taking	  care	  of	  one’s	  children	  are	  just	  a	  few	  examples	  of	  behaviors	  that	  involve	  social	  cognition.	  Each	  of	  these	  events	  involves	  interpreting	  others’	  behavior,	  anticipating	  what	  they	  will	  do	  next,	  and	  facilitating	  interaction	  with	  other	  agents.	  Phenomenology	  is	  the	  study	  of	  conscious	  experiences	  from	  the	  first-­‐person	  perspective.1	  Some	  theorists	  regard	  phenomenology	  as	  crucially	  important	  to	  the	  study	  of	  
                                                1	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  what	  I	  call	  phenomenological	  reports.	  These	  are	  first-­‐person	  reports	  on	  one’s	  conscious	  experiences.	  Examples	  include	  reporting	  that	  I	  am	  experiencing	  a	  painful	  sensation,	  seeing	  a	  yellow	  patch,	  feeling	  angry,	  and	  thinking	  about	  what	  I	  had	  for	  breakfast.	  In	  each	  case,	  I	  am	  reporting	  what	  I	  am	  (or	  I	  take	  myself	  to	  be)	  consciously	  experiencing.	  Though	  this	  terminology	  is	  standard	  in	  the	  social	  cognition	  debates	  (Gallagher,	  2012;	  Herschbach,	  2008a;	  Spaulding,	  2010;	  Zahavi,	  2011)	  and	  more	  generally	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social	  cognition	  (De	  Jaegher	  &	  Di	  Paolo,	  2007;	  Fuchs,	  2012;	  Gallagher,	  2012;	  Ratcliffe,	  2006;	  Zahavi,	  2011).	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  phenomenological	  evidence	  about	  our	  social	  interactions	  can	  and	  should	  be	  marshaled	  as	  evidence	  for	  or	  against	  theories	  of	  social	  cognition.	  To	  this	  end,	  these	  theorists	  contend	  that	  the	  phenomenological	  evidence	  supports	  their	  theories	  of	  social	  cognition,	  variously	  called	  Interaction	  Theory,	  Embodied	  Cognition,	  and	  Enactive	  Cognition.	  Moreover,	  they	  argue	  that	  the	  phenomenological	  evidence	  disconfirms	  alternative	  accounts,	  e.g.,	  the	  Theory	  Theory,	  the	  Simulation	  Theory,	  and	  hybrid	  versions	  of	  the	  two	  accounts.	  These	  theories,	  it	  is	  argued,	  predict	  conscious	  experiences	  that	  phenomenology	  shows	  we	  do	  not	  have,	  and	  so	  we	  should	  reject	  these	  theories.2	  	  In	  contrast,	  other	  theorists	  argue	  that	  phenomenological	  evidence	  is	  not	  so	  important	  and	  perhaps	  even	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  debates	  about	  social	  cognition	  (Carruthers,	  2009;	  Currie,	  2008;	  Herschbach,	  2008b;	  Jacob,	  2011;	  Spaulding,	  2010).	  Proponents	  of	  this	  view	  hold	  that	  the	  relevant	  debates	  in	  the	  social	  cognition	  literature	  concern	  the	  cognitive	  architecture	  responsible	  for	  our	  ability	  to	  understand	  and	  interact	  with	  other	  agents,	  and	  phenomenology	  tells	  us	  very	  little	  about	  cognitive	  architecture.	  	   There	  is	  one	  point	  of	  agreement	  in	  this	  dispute	  between	  phenomenologists	  and	  non-­‐phenomenologists.	  All	  parties	  to	  this	  debate	  accept	  –	  or,	  in	  any	  case,	  ought	  to	  accept	  –	  that	  
                                                                                                                                                       in	  empirically	  oriented	  analytic	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  (Dennett,	  2003;	  Noë,	  2007),	  continental	  philosophers	  in	  the	  phenomenological	  tradition	  would	  regard	  “phenomenological	  reports”	  as	  an	  oxymoron	  because	  to	  verbally	  express	  one’s	  phenomenology	  is	  to	  defeat	  the	  purpose	  of	  phenomenology.	  To	  verbalize	  one’s	  experiences	  is	  to	  impose	  a	  linguistic,	  cultural	  framework	  on	  the	  experience,	  which	  thwarts	  the	  goal	  of	  studying	  the	  experience	  itself.	  	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  continuity	  with	  the	  ongoing	  debate,	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  use	  the	  terminology	  “phenomenological	  reports.”	  	  2	  The	  case	  for	  interactive,	  embodied,	  and	  enactive	  accounts	  of	  social	  cognition	  does	  not	  rest	  
wholly	  on	  this	  phenomenological	  argument.	  Proponents	  of	  these	  views	  also	  claim	  support	  from	  developmental	  psychology	  and	  the	  alleged	  failure	  of	  the	  main	  alternatives,	  the	  Theory	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phenomenology	  at	  least	  weakly	  constrains	  the	  study	  of	  social	  cognition.	  Specifically,	  a	  theory	  of	  social	  cognition	  ought	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  our	  phenomenological	  experience	  of	  social	  interactions.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  would	  count	  against	  a	  theory	  if	  it	  entailed	  a	  phenomenology	  radically	  different	  from	  what	  we	  experience.3	  This	  is	  a	  very	  weak	  constraint.	  A	  theory	  could	  satisfy	  this	  constraint	  simply	  by	  having	  no	  implications	  for	  our	  phenomenological	  experience	  of	  social	  interactions.	  If	  the	  claim	  at	  issue	  is	  that	  phenomenology	  only	  weakly	  constrains	  the	  study	  of	  social	  cognition,	  phenomenology	  would	  not	  have	  any	  special	  methodological	  role	  in	  debates	  about	  social	  cognition,	  and	  there	  would	  be	  no	  serious	  disagreement	  between	  the	  two	  views	  described	  above.	  Highlighting	  this	  point	  of	  agreement	  brings	  into	  focus	  the	  true	  disagreement	  between	  phenomenologists	  and	  non-­‐phenomenologists.	  This	  disagreement	  concerns	  whether	  phenomenology	  strongly	  constrains	  the	  study	  of	  social	  cognition.	  To	  settle	  this	  disagreement	  we	  have	  to	  determine	  whether	  phenomenology	  plays	  a	  more	  substantial	  methodological	  role.	  For	  instance,	  can	  phenomenological	  evidence	  play	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  accepting	  or	  rejecting	  social	  cognition	  theories?	  Is	  it	  the	  case	  that	  a	  theory	  of	  social	  cognition	  ought	  to	  explain	  and	  be	  empirically	  supported	  by	  our	  phenomenological	  experience?	  Some	  theorists	  employ	  phenomenological	  evidence	  in	  just	  this	  way	  (Gallagher,	  2012;	  Zahavi,	  2011).	  Notice	  that	  this	  is	  a	  much	  stronger	  constraint	  that	  many	  theories	  of	  
                                                3	  Another	  potential	  point	  of	  agreement	  is	  that	  a	  completed	  account	  of	  social	  cognition	  will	  explain	  how	  the	  sub-­‐personal	  mechanisms	  posited	  enable	  the	  conscious	  social	  experiences	  we	  have.	  However,	  no	  theorist	  purports	  to	  have	  a	  completed	  account	  of	  social	  cognition	  yet,	  and	  phenomenologists	  and	  non-­‐phenomenologists	  disagree	  about	  the	  methodological	  role	  of	  phenomenology	  in	  the	  current	  theoretical	  context.	  They	  even	  disagree	  about	  whether	  phenomenology	  is	  a	  reliable	  guide	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  cognition,	  e.g.,	  whether	  social	  cognition	  is	  perceptually	  based	  or	  inferentially	  based	  (Spaulding,	  forthcoming).	  Thus,	  this	  point	  of	  agreement	  about	  a	  completed	  account	  of	  social	  cognition	  has	  little	  bearing	  on	  the	  current	  debate.	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social	  cognition	  would	  not	  satisfy,	  e.g.,	  any	  theory	  that	  has	  no	  implications	  about	  our	  phenomenology.	  	  Whether	  this	  stronger	  constraint	  on	  theories	  of	  social	  cognition	  is	  legitimate	  depends	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  evidence.	  The	  following	  three	  features	  are	  characteristic	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  capable	  of	  playing	  a	  substantial	  methodological	  role:	  
novelty,	  reliability,	  and	  relevance.	  Evidence	  is	  novel	  when	  it	  provides	  information	  beyond	  what	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  and	  presupposed	  by	  the	  theories	  debated.	  It	  is	  reliable	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  consistent,	  accurate,	  and	  unbiased.	  Evidence	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  can	  confirm	  or	  disconfirm	  some	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  debated.	  We	  need	  not	  quibble	  over	  how	  to	  assign	  weights	  to	  each	  characteristic	  or	  whether	  all	  three	  characteristics	  are,	  strictly	  speaking,	  necessary.	  It	  is	  enough	  to	  note	  that,	  in	  general,	  empirical	  evidence	  capable	  of	  playing	  a	  substantial	  methodological	  role	  has	  these	  three	  features.	  Hence,	  for	  proponents	  of	  phenomenology	  the	  task	  is	  to	  establish	  that	  phenomenological	  evidence	  has	  at	  least	  some	  of	  these	  characteristics.	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  argue	  that	  phenomenological	  evidence	  has	  none	  of	  these	  three	  characteristics.	  Consequently,	  phenomenology	  should	  not	  play	  a	  substantial	  role	  in	  debates	  about	  social	  cognition.	  If	  successful,	  this	  argument	  will	  show	  that	  the	  phenomenological	  arguments	  employed	  in	  the	  social	  cognition	  debate	  are	  wrongheaded	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  disregarded.	  	  	  
2.	  Phenomenology	  of	  Social	  Cognition:	  Summarizing	  the	  Debate	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Traditionally,	  philosophers	  and	  psychologists	  have	  assumed	  that	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  and	  successfully	  interact	  with	  other	  people	  we	  must	  understand	  how	  mental	  states,	  such	  as	  beliefs,	  desires,	  and	  intentions,	  inform	  behavior	  and	  how	  behavior	  affects	  mental	  states.	  The	  mainstream	  view	  is	  that	  adult	  human	  social	  cognition	  fundamentally	  involves	  mindreading,	  i.e.,	  attributing	  mental	  states	  to	  others	  in	  order	  to	  understand,	  anticipate,	  and	  influence	  their	  behavior.	  Two	  competing	  accounts	  have	  dominated	  the	  mindreading	  literature:	  the	  Theory	  Theory	  (TT)	  and	  the	  Simulation	  Theory	  (ST).	  	  The	  TT	  holds	  that	  we	  explain	  and	  predict	  behavior	  by	  employing	  a	  tacit	  folk	  psychological	  theory	  about	  how	  mental	  states	  inform	  behavior.	  With	  our	  folk	  psychological	  theory,	  we	  infer	  from	  a	  target’s	  behavior	  what	  his	  or	  her	  mental	  states	  probably	  are.	  From	  these	  inferences,	  plus	  the	  psychological	  principles	  in	  the	  theory	  connecting	  mental	  states	  to	  behavior,	  we	  predict	  the	  target’s	  behavior.	  	  The	  ST,	  in	  contrast,	  holds	  that	  we	  explain	  and	  predict	  a	  target’s	  behavior	  by	  using	  our	  own	  minds	  as	  a	  simulation	  of	  the	  other	  person’s	  mind.	  To	  explain	  a	  target’s	  behavior,	  we	  put	  ourselves	  in	  another’s	  shoes,	  so	  to	  speak,	  and	  imagine	  what	  our	  mental	  states	  would	  be	  and	  how	  we	  would	  behave	  if	  we	  were	  that	  agent	  in	  that	  particular	  situation.	  To	  predict	  a	  target’s	  behavior,	  we	  take	  the	  attributed	  mental	  states	  as	  input	  and	  simulate	  the	  target’s	  decision	  about	  what	  to	  do	  next.	  The	  TT	  and	  the	  ST	  disagree	  about	  how	  mindreading	  works.	  The	  TT	  contends	  that	  it	  is	  an	  information-­‐rich	  theoretical	  process,	  whereas	  the	  ST	  maintains	  that	  it	  is	  an	  information-­‐poor	  simulational	  process.	  Though	  TT	  and	  ST	  proponents	  disagree	  about	  how	  mindreading	  operates,	  they	  agree	  that	  mindreading	  is	  pervasive	  and	  the	  primary	  way	  we	  understand	  others.	  They	  also	  agree	  that	  much	  of	  mindreading	  occurs	  subconsciously.	  Both	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theorizing	  and	  simulating	  may	  be	  conscious,	  deliberative	  processes	  or	  spontaneous,	  subconscious	  processes.	  	  Phenomenologists	  argue	  that	  both	  the	  TT	  and	  the	  ST	  are	  misguided	  accounts	  of	  social	  cognition.	  They	  contend	  that	  there	  is	  good	  phenomenological	  evidence	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  mindreading	  is	  pervasive	  and	  our	  primary	  mode	  of	  understanding	  others	  (De	  Jaegher	  &	  Di	  Paolo,	  2007;	  Fuchs,	  2012;	  Gallagher,	  2012;	  Hutto,	  2008;	  Ratcliffe,	  2006;	  Zahavi,	  2011).	  Both	  TT	  and	  ST	  hold	  that	  we	  resort	  to	  third-­‐person	  based	  explanation	  and	  prediction	  in	  our	  ordinary	  social	  interactions.	  According	  to	  critics	  of	  mindreading,	  this	  implies	  that	  we	  adopt	  a	  spectator’s	  perspective	  on	  our	  interactions.	  However,	  phenomenology	  tells	  us	  that	  we	  rarely	  adopt	  a	  spectator’s	  perspective.	  Relying	  on	  introspection-­‐based	  reports	  on	  our	  experience	  of	  social	  interactions,	  phenomenologists	  argue	  that	  our	  ordinary	  interactions	  do	  not	  involve	  explanation	  and	  prediction	  and	  they	  are	  not	  third-­‐person	  based	  attempts	  to	  theorize	  about	  or	  simulate	  mental	  states.	  Thus,	  phenomenology	  tells	  us	  that	  mindreading	  is	  rare	  and	  hence	  not	  our	  primary	  mode	  of	  social	  cognition.	  	  Of	  course,	  mindreading	  theorists	  maintain	  that	  much	  of	  mindreading	  is	  not	  consciously	  accessible,	  so	  an	  appeal	  to	  phenomenology	  is	  not	  so	  straightforward.	  Phenomenologists	  recognize	  that	  phenomenology	  cannot	  demonstrate	  directly	  whether	  certain	  sub-­‐personal	  processes	  are	  operative.	  However,	  they	  argue	  that	  it	  can	  serve	  as	  
indirect	  evidence	  about	  sub-­‐personal	  processing.	  Articulating	  this	  view,	  Shaun	  Gallagher	  argues:	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Phenomenology	  cannot	  tell	  us	  whether	  our	  response	  to	  the	  exasperation	  in	  a	  person’s	  
voice	  involves	  an	  implicit	  (sub-­‐conscious)	  theory	  or	  pretend	  belief.	  But	  a	  careful	  and	  
methodical	  phenomenology	  should	  be	  able	  to	  tell	  us	  whether,	  when	  we	  hear	  the	  
exasperated	  voice,	  our	  usual	  response	  involves	  formulating	  an	  explanation	  or	  
predicting	  what	  the	  person	  will	  do	  next.	  Our	  encounters	  with	  others	  are	  in	  fact	  not	  
normally	  occasions	  for	  theorizing	  or	  simulating	  if	  such	  nonconscious	  procedures	  are	  
cashed	  out	  phenomenologically	  as	  explaining	  or	  predicting	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  postulated	  
mental	  states	  (Gallagher,	  2001,	  p.	  89).4	  	  	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  if	  non-­‐conscious	  mindreading	  is	  going	  on,	  it	  should	  result	  in	  phenomenological	  experience	  of	  third-­‐person-­‐based	  explanation	  and	  prediction.	  Phenomenology	  tells	  us	  that	  our	  normal	  intersubjective	  experiences	  are	  not	  best	  characterized	  as	  third-­‐person-­‐based	  explanation	  and	  prediction.	  Hence,	  phenomenological	  considerations	  indicate	  that	  non-­‐conscious	  mindreading	  is	  not	  operative	  in	  our	  normal	  intersubjective	  experiences.	  	  In	  response	  to	  this	  argument,	  mindreading	  proponents	  question	  the	  reliability	  and	  relevance	  of	  phenomenology	  in	  this	  context,	  specifically	  challenging	  the	  idea	  that	  non-­‐conscious	  mindreading	  would	  manifest	  in	  conscious,	  explicit	  explanation	  and	  prediction	  (Herschbach,	  2008b;	  Jacob,	  2011;	  Spaulding,	  2010).	  In	  a	  previous	  article,	  I	  have	  articulating	  these	  objections:	  	  
                                                4	  For	  a	  more	  recent	  defense	  of	  these	  claims,	  see	  Gallagher	  (2012).	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The	  debate	  in	  mindreading	  between	  the	  [TT]	  and	  the	  [ST]	  is	  a	  debate	  about	  the	  
architecture	  and	  sub-­‐personal	  processes	  responsible	  for	  social	  cognition.	  Neither	  
account	  is	  committed	  to	  any	  view	  on	  what	  phenomenology	  tells	  us	  is	  going	  on	  in	  our	  
ordinary	  interactions.	  With	  mindreading,	  there	  is	  a	  process	  (theorizing	  or	  simulating),	  
and	  there	  is	  a	  product	  (an	  explanation	  or	  a	  prediction).	  In	  general,	  neither	  the	  process	  
nor	  the	  product	  need	  be	  consciously	  accessible,	  let	  alone	  phenomenologically	  
transparent	  (Spaulding,	  2010,	  p.	  131).	  	  Mindreading	  proponents	  hold	  that	  the	  phenomenological	  fluidity	  of	  our	  ordinary	  interactions	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  claim	  that	  mindreading	  is	  an	  important	  and	  pervasive	  way	  that	  we	  understand	  others.	  After	  all,	  many	  cognitive	  activities	  are	  phenomenologically	  fluid	  yet	  realized	  by	  complex	  computational	  processes	  that	  involve	  inferential	  processing	  at	  the	  sub-­‐personal	  level.	  Language	  and	  vision,	  it	  is	  argued,	  are	  two	  clear	  examples	  of	  this	  (Spaulding,	  2010,	  p.	  135).	  	  	   Phenomenologists	  offer	  three	  related	  replies	  to	  these	  arguments.	  First,	  they	  argue	  that	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  phenomenological	  experience	  sometimes	  is	  unreliable	  that	  it	  always	  is.	  Careful	  phenomenological	  analysis	  may	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  these	  concerns	  about	  reliability.	  Second,	  generalizing	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  results	  in	  the	  unpalatable	  conclusion	  that	  phenomenology	  never	  helps	  us	  understand	  how	  our	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  work	  and	  we	  never	  should	  base	  our	  arguments	  on	  phenomenological	  considerations	  (Gallagher,	  2012,	  p.	  203).	  Third,	  phenomenology	  in	  fact	  is	  necessary	  for	  understanding	  social	  cognition.	  Dan	  Zahavi,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  accounts	  of	  social	  cognition	  are	  supposed	  to	  explain	  the	  full	  diversity	  of	  personal-­‐level	  social	  cognition.	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If	  we	  don’t	  know	  the	  explanandum	  well,	  if	  we	  don’t	  possess	  careful	  descriptions	  of	  its	  
different	  facets	  –	  which	  is	  arguably	  one	  of	  the	  things	  that	  phenomenology	  can	  offer	  –	  it	  
will,	  to	  put	  it	  mildly,	  be	  kind	  of	  hard	  to	  assess	  the	  relevance	  and	  explanatory	  power	  of	  
the	  sub-­‐personal	  mechanisms	  (Zahavi,	  2011,	  p.	  555).	  	  	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  phenomenology	  helps	  us	  understand	  personal-­‐level	  social	  cognition,	  which	  is	  necessary	  to	  assess	  hypotheses	  about	  sub-­‐personal	  cognitive	  processes.	  Thus,	  far	  from	  being	  irrelevant,	  phenomenology	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  study	  of	  social	  cognition.	  From	  this	  relatively	  brief	  summary,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  outlines	  of	  the	  debate	  between	  the	  phenomenologists	  and	  mindreading	  proponents.	  Mindreading	  proponents	  argue	  that	  phenomenological	  evidence	  is	  too	  unreliable	  to	  be	  useful	  and	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  questions	  at	  issue.	  Phenomenologists	  hold	  that	  phenomenology	  can	  be	  reliable	  and	  is	  part	  of	  the	  
explanandum	  of	  social	  cognition	  theories,	  and	  this	  warrants	  giving	  phenomenology	  a	  significant	  methodological	  role.	  	  	   To	  resolve	  this	  debate,	  we	  need	  to	  determine	  whether	  phenomenology	  strongly	  constrains	  the	  study	  of	  social	  cognition.	  For	  phenomenology	  to	  play	  a	  substantial	  methodological	  role,	  it	  ought	  provide	  novel,	  reliable,	  and	  relevant	  information.	  The	  next	  three	  sections	  address	  these	  criteria.	  I	  shall	  argue	  that	  phenomenological	  evidence	  lacks	  all	  three	  characteristics,	  and	  thus	  it	  has	  no	  special	  evidential	  role	  in	  social	  cognition	  debates.	  	  	  
3.	  The	  Novelty	  of	  Phenomenological	  Evidence	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  Theory	  choice	  always	  is	  comparative.	  When	  testing	  a	  theory,	  we	  always	  are	  testing	  it	  against	  some	  available	  alternative	  theory.	  The	  criterion	  that	  evidence	  be	  novel	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  this	  comparative	  context.	  Evidence	  is	  novel	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  provides	  information	  beyond	  what	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  and	  presupposed	  by	  the	  theories	  debated.	  	  The	  novelty	  criterion	  matters	  for	  two	  related	  reasons.	  First,	  if	  the	  evidence	  is	  not	  novel,	  if	  it	  is	  taken	  into	  consideration	  either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  by	  all	  the	  theories	  debated,	  then	  it	  would	  inappropriate	  to	  argue	  that	  one	  of	  the	  theories	  debated	  is	  not	  supported	  by	  that	  evidence.	  That	  evidence	  not	  only	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  theory,	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  background	  information	  used	  to	  construct	  the	  theory.	  In	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  if	  a	  theory	  of	  social	  cognition	  takes	  for	  granted	  that	  ordinary	  social	  interactions	  have	  a	  certain	  phenomenology,	  then	  (so	  long	  as	  we	  agree	  on	  the	  phenomenological	  nature	  of	  our	  interactions)	  the	  objection	  that	  the	  theory	  is	  not	  supported	  by	  our	  phenomenological	  experience	  appears	  misguided.	  The	  second	  reason	  novelty	  is	  important	  involves	  the	  distinction	  between	  mere	  accommodation	  of	  previously	  known	  data	  and	  novel	  prediction	  (Hitchcock	  &	  Sober,	  2004).	  A	  theory	  accommodates	  some	  phenomenon	  if	  the	  theory	  was	  constructed	  specifically	  to	  predict	  that	  phenomenon.	  A	  phenomenon	  is	  novel	  to	  a	  theory	  only	  if	  the	  theory	  was	  not	  constructed	  specifically	  to	  predict	  that	  phenomenon.	  Accommodating	  data	  is	  not	  
detrimental	  for	  a	  theory.	  After	  all,	  we	  do	  not	  expect	  empirical	  theories	  to	  be	  constructed	  a	  
priori,	  and	  fit	  with	  existing	  data	  is	  a	  good	  thing.	  Nevertheless,	  accurately	  predicting	  some	  phenomenon	  beyond	  that	  which	  it	  was	  constructed	  to	  predict	  is	  the	  mark	  of	  a	  good	  theory.	  	  
 11 
There	  is	  a	  long-­‐standing	  debate	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  between	  predictivists	  and	  non-­‐predictivists	  about	  whether	  the	  prediction	  of	  novel	  phenomena	  provides	  better	  epistemic	  support	  for	  a	  theory	  than	  the	  accommodation	  of	  previously	  known	  data.	  Without	  wading	  too	  deeply	  into	  this	  debate,	  I	  suggest	  that	  a	  theory’s	  ability	  to	  accommodate	  previously	  known	  data	  is	  weak	  support	  for	  that	  theory.	  Moreover,	  when	  deciding	  amongst	  theories,	  accommodating	  previously	  known	  data	  is	  an	  advantage	  only	  if	  the	  competitor	  theories	  neither	  accommodate	  nor	  predict	  those	  data.	  Thus,	  accommodating	  phenomenological	  evidence	  is	  an	  advantage	  for	  phenomenological	  theories	  only	  if	  mindreading	  theories	  neither	  accommodate	  nor	  predict	  the	  phenomenological	  evidence.	  Phenomenological	  evidence	  is	  not	  novel	  to	  mindreading	  theories	  because	  they	  are	  constructed	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  such	  evidence.	  Although	  mindreading	  proponents	  do	  not	  provide	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  our	  phenomenology	  of	  social	  interactions,	  and	  they	  do	  not	  regard	  phenomenology	  as	  a	  good	  guide	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  cognitive	  systems,	  their	  descriptions	  of	  the	  theories	  reflect	  the	  presupposition	  of	  common	  phenomenological	  evidence.	  For	  example,	  in	  one	  of	  the	  foundational	  articles	  on	  theory	  of	  mind,	  Simon	  Blackburn	  explains	  the	  relationship	  between	  mindreading	  and	  phenomenology.	  	  
Theory	  [of	  mind]	  plays	  an	  explanatory	  role,	  not	  a	  phenomenological	  one.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  
…	  the	  listener	  finds	  himself	  making	  an	  inference	  or	  indulging	  a	  train	  of	  reasoning.	  
Obviously	  no	  such	  conscious	  process	  occurs:	  this	  is	  what	  makes	  the	  judgement	  
spontaneous.	  But	  it	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  true	  that	  there	  exist	  principles	  to	  take	  us	  from	  
evidence	  to	  interpretation;	  that	  these	  principles	  can	  be	  cited	  when	  dispute	  or	  demand	  
for	  justification	  arises;	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  ‘internalise’	  those	  principles	  to	  become	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a	  trained	  or	  well	  tuned	  observer;	  and	  that	  one	  learned	  the	  form	  a	  ‘network	  of	  
corrigible	  assumptions’,	  or	  in	  short	  a	  theory	  (Blackburn,	  1992,	  p.	  192).	  	  	  Additionally,	  in	  a	  widely	  cited	  collection	  of	  essays	  on	  the	  TT	  and	  the	  ST,	  Martin	  Davies	  and	  Tony	  Stone	  describe	  the	  TT	  in	  the	  following	  way.	  	  	  
When	  I	  predict	  what	  someone	  will	  do,	  or	  explain	  why	  they	  have	  done	  something,	  I	  do	  
so	  by	  deploying	  this	  theory.	  Most	  of	  us	  are,	  of	  course,	  quite	  unaware	  that	  this	  is	  what	  
we	  are	  doing;	  but,	  as	  with	  grammatical	  theory,	  the	  fact	  is	  reckoned	  to	  be	  unimportant.	  
Our	  relationship	  to	  the	  psychological	  theory	  is	  allowed	  to	  be	  ‘tacit’	  or	  ‘implicit’	  
knowledge	  (Davies	  &	  Stone,	  1995,	  p.	  2).	  	  	  Davies	  and	  Stone	  draw	  an	  analogy	  between	  mindreading	  and	  the	  processing	  of	  grammar,	  both	  of	  which	  involve	  complex	  computational	  processes	  but	  no	  phenomenological	  experience	  of	  these	  complex	  computational	  processes.	  I	  highlight	  these	  quotes	  to	  show	  that	  from	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  mindreading	  debate	  theorists	  distinguished	  between	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  and	  phenomenological	  experiences.	  Such	  remarks	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  TT.	  Simulation	  theorists	  also	  are	  careful	  to	  point	  out	  that	  many	  mindreading	  simulations	  take	  place	  subconsciously	  (Goldman,	  2006,	  p.	  161;	  Gordon,	  1992,	  p.	  12).	  One	  can	  find	  many	  instances	  of	  mindreading	  theorists	  cautioning	  that	  the	  mechanisms	  they	  describe	  need	  not	  and	  often	  do	  not	  operate	  consciously	  and	  explicitly.	  Such	  qualifying	  remarks	  indicate	  that	  mindreading	  theories	  presuppose	  that	  our	  ordinary	  social	  interactions	  often	  seem	  to	  involve	  no	  effortful	  deliberation	  about	  mental	  states.	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These	  comments	  reflect	  awareness	  of	  the	  basic	  phenomenological	  character	  of	  ordinary	  social	  interactions	  and	  serve	  to	  clarify	  that	  the	  TT	  and	  the	  ST	  do	  not	  mistakenly	  entail	  certain	  phenomenological	  experiences.	  If	  mindreading	  theorists	  did	  not	  presuppose	  certain	  commonplace	  phenomenological	  evidence,	  they	  would	  not	  need	  to	  make	  these	  clarificatory	  remarks	  about	  our	  conscious	  experiences.	  Thus,	  phenomenological	  evidence	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  and	  presupposed	  by	  mindreading	  theories.5	  As	  I	  noted	  above,	  phenomenological	  theories’	  ability	  to	  accommodate	  our	  phenomenological	  experience	  is	  an	  advantage	  only	  if	  the	  competitor	  theories	  neither	  accommodate	  nor	  predict	  our	  phenomenological	  experience.	  However,	  as	  these	  comments	  indicate,	  mindreading	  theories	  also	  accommodate	  basic	  phenomenological	  evidence.	  They	  presuppose	  commonly	  accepted	  phenomenological	  claims	  and	  construct	  the	  theories	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  this	  evidence.	  Consideration	  of	  these	  points	  indicates	  that	  phenomenological	  evidence	  is	  not	  novel	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense,	  and	  thus	  it	  lacks	  the	  first	  feature	  of	  good	  evidence.	  	  Although	  mindreading	  proponents	  presuppose	  commonly	  accepted	  phenomenological	  claims,	  phenomenologists	  and	  mindreading	  theorists	  take	  very	  different	  perspectives	  on	  phenomenological	  evidence.	  Unlike	  phenomenologists,	  mindreading	  theorists	  do	  not	  take	  phenomenology	  to	  be	  an	  important	  source	  of	  evidence	  about	  social	  cognition.	  Rather,	  phenomenology	  is	  regarded	  as	  extremely	  defeasible	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  phenomenological	  reports	  about	  our	  social	  interactions	  vary	  widely.	  Some	  people	  
                                                5	  Despite	  these	  examples,	  not	  all	  mindreading	  proponents	  carefully	  distinguish	  claims	  about	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  from	  claims	  about	  our	  conscious	  experiences.	  Phenomenologists’	  recent	  critiques	  of	  mindreading	  have	  been	  a	  useful	  corrective	  to	  this	  sloppiness.	  Nevertheless,	  mindreading	  proponents	  can,	  should,	  and	  many	  do	  distinguish	  phenomenological	  claims	  from	  claims	  about	  cognitive	  architecture.	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report	  regularly	  thinking	  about	  others’	  mental	  states,	  others	  report	  such	  thinking	  only	  when	  a	  social	  interaction	  breaks	  down,	  and	  others	  report	  that	  they	  almost	  never	  are	  consciously	  aware	  of	  thinking	  about	  others’	  mental	  states.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  variability	  of	  phenomenological	  reports.	  Mindreading	  proponents	  do	  not	  put	  much	  stock	  in	  phenomenological	  reports	  because	  of	  their	  variability.	  	  Second,	  mindreading	  proponents	  do	  not	  regard	  phenomenology	  as	  a	  good	  guide	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  underlying	  cognitive	  mechanisms.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  a	  standing	  skepticism	  about	  inferences	  from	  phenomenology	  to	  cognitive	  architecture.	  Just	  as	  the	  phenomenological	  fluidity	  of	  visual	  and	  linguistic	  processing	  fails	  to	  reflect	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  vision	  and	  language,	  phenomenology	  of	  social	  interactions	  may	  be	  equally	  misleading.	  The	  gap	  between	  phenomenological	  experience	  and	  the	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  responsible	  for	  social	  cognition	  impels	  mindreading	  proponents	  to	  regard	  phenomenology	  as	  at	  best	  provisional	  evidence	  in	  social	  cognition	  debates.	  In	  sum,	  mindreading	  proponents	  take	  for	  granted	  some	  basic,	  common	  phenomenological	  experiences,	  e.g.,	  that	  we	  may	  not	  always	  feel	  like	  we	  are	  engaged	  in	  effortful	  deliberation	  about	  theoretical	  causal	  states,	  and	  sometimes	  we	  have	  the	  feeling	  of	  simply	  knowing,	  without	  deliberation,	  why	  a	  target	  is	  behaving	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  and	  what	  she	  will	  do	  next.	  This	  entails	  that	  phenomenological	  evidence	  is	  not	  novel	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense.	  However,	  mindreading	  proponents	  regard	  these	  and	  other	  phenomenological	  claims	  as	  extremely	  defeasible	  because	  of	  concerns	  about	  their	  reliability	  and	  relevance.	  Thus,	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  methodological	  role	  of	  phenomenology	  hinges	  on	  whether	  phenomenological	  evidence	  is	  reliable	  and	  relevant.	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4.	  The	  Reliability	  of	  Phenomenology	  
	  The	  phenomenological	  evidence	  at	  issue	  consists	  in	  first-­‐person	  reports	  of	  one’s	  conscious	  experience	  of	  social	  interactions.	  This	  section	  considers	  whether	  phenomenological	  evidence	  is	  reliable.	  I	  evaluate	  reliability	  along	  three	  dimensions:	  consistency,	  accuracy,	  and	  
objectivity.6	  Below	  is	  a	  description	  of	  these	  dimensions	  of	  reliability.	  	  	  
• Consistency:	  Phenomenological	  reports	  are	  consistent	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  are	  similar	  for	  similar	  interactions.	  
• Accuracy:	  A	  subject’s	  reported	  phenomenology	  is	  accurate	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  provides	  a	  factually	  correct	  description	  of	  nature	  of	  the	  experience.	  
• Objectivity:	  A	  subject’s	  phenomenological	  report	  is	  objective	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  not	  significantly	  biased	  by	  evidentially	  irrelevant	  factors.	  	   The	  consistency	  dimension	  can	  be	  understood	  intrapersonally	  or	  interpersonally.	  A	  subject’s	  phenomenological	  reports	  are	  intrapersonally	  consistent	  insofar	  as	  the	  subject	  reports	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  phenomenology	  for	  similar	  social	  interactions.	  Phenomenological	  reports	  are	  interpersonally	  consistent	  insofar	  as	  two	  (or	  more)	  subjects	  report	  similar	  phenomenology	  for	  similar	  interactions.	  	  
                                                6	  Reliability	  sometimes	  is	  conflated	  with	  publicity,	  i.e.,	  intersubjective	  testability.	  Evidence	  from	  public	  methods	  may	  be	  validated	  as	  reliable	  more	  easily	  than	  evidence	  from	  private	  methods.	  Although	  I	  regard	  publicity	  as	  important	  –	  perhaps	  critically	  important	  –	  for	  whether	  evidence	  counts	  as	  scientific,	  in	  this	  context	  it	  would	  be	  question	  begging	  to	  require	  publicity	  because	  phenomenology	  simply	  is	  private	  (Dennett,	  2003;	  Goldman,	  1997).	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These	  qualities	  sometimes	  cluster	  together	  insofar	  as	  accurate	  reports	  tend	  to	  be	  consistent	  and	  unbiased,	  and	  inconsistent	  reports	  tend	  to	  be	  inaccurate	  and	  biased.	  However,	  they	  are	  distinct	  qualities	  and	  can	  come	  apart	  in	  various	  ways.	  A	  particular	  set	  of	  reports	  may	  be	  intrapersonally	  consistent	  yet	  interpersonally	  inconsistent.	  That	  is,	  one	  person	  may	  consistently	  report	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  experience	  whereas	  others	  report	  different	  experiences	  in	  similar	  situations.	  Alternatively,	  a	  set	  of	  reports	  may	  be	  intrapersonally	  and	  interpersonally	  consistent	  but	  inaccurate.	  For	  example,	  classic	  experiments	  on	  introspection	  show	  that	  in	  particular	  circumstances	  most	  people	  confabulate	  reports	  of	  their	  conscious	  experience	  (Nisbett	  &	  Wilson,	  1977).	  In	  these	  cases,	  subjects	  consistently	  report	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  experience	  that	  we	  know	  to	  be	  false.	  A	  third	  possibility	  is	  that	  a	  set	  of	  reports	  is	  consistent	  and	  accurate	  yet	  biased.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  due	  to	  a	  selection,	  reporting,	  or	  interpretive	  bias,	  the	  set	  of	  reports	  does	  not	  fairly	  represent	  the	  target	  phenomena.	  	  For	  phenomenological	  evidence	  to	  play	  a	  substantial	  methodological	  role,	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  reliable.	  Evidence	  is	  reliable	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  consistent,	  accurate,	  and	  unbiased.	  Consider	  consistency	  first.	  Presumably	  similar	  social	  cognitive	  processes	  are	  operative	  in	  subjects	  who	  are	  in	  similar	  social	  interactions.	  	  If	  reports	  are	  intrapersonally	  and	  interpersonally	  consistent,	  we	  can	  extrapolate	  from	  these	  reports	  to	  general	  claims	  about	  cognition	  even	  if	  the	  reports	  are	  inaccurate	  and	  biased.	  However,	  if	  subjects’	  reports	  are	  intrapersonally	  or	  interpersonally	  inconsistent,	  then	  we	  cannot	  extrapolate	  from	  these	  reports	  to	  conclusions	  about	  social	  cognitive	  processes	  in	  general.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  individuals	  experience	  the	  social	  world	  differently.	  Some	  individuals	  may	  engage	  in	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conscious,	  deliberative	  mindreading	  more	  or	  less	  than	  others,	  of	  course.	  But	  without	  some	  level	  of	  consistency,	  empirical	  generalizations	  are	  difficult	  to	  make.	  	  Inconsistency	  could	  be	  mitigated	  if	  we	  had	  criteria	  for	  judging	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  reports.	  That	  is,	  so	  long	  as	  we	  can	  judge	  which	  phenomenological	  reports	  are	  accurate,	  modest	  amounts	  of	  variability	  in	  phenomenological	  reports	  are	  not	  problematic.	  With	  accuracy	  criteria,	  we	  could	  differentiate	  inaccurate	  reports	  from	  accurate	  reports	  of	  idiosyncratic	  social	  experiences.	  We	  do	  not	  always	  have	  direct,	  objective	  measures	  of	  accuracy	  for	  first-­‐person	  reports.	  Sometimes	  we	  have	  indirect	  accuracy	  measures,	  such	  as	  testing	  for	  behavior	  that	  one	  would	  expect	  if	  the	  report	  were	  true.	  In	  other	  cases,	  we	  lack	  even	  those	  indirect	  measures	  of	  accuracy.	  This	  situation	  is	  not	  terribly	  problematic	  if	  the	  reports	  generally	  are	  consistent.	  However,	  if	  reports	  are	  inconsistent	  and	  we	  lack	  even	  indirect	  measures	  of	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  reports,	  this	  is	  terribly	  problematic.	  	  Finally,	  if	  phenomenological	  reports	  are	  subject	  to	  systematic	  bias,	  they	  do	  not	  provide	  good	  data	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  interactions.	  Of	  course,	  all	  evidence	  is	  subject	  to	  interpretive	  bias	  because	  all	  evidence	  must	  be	  interpreted	  by	  theorists.	  Any	  piece	  of	  evidence	  may	  be	  skewed	  by	  a	  theorist’s	  interpretation	  of	  that	  evidence.	  The	  point	  at	  issue	  here	  is	  not	  whether	  theorists	  interpreting	  the	  reports	  are	  biased,	  but	  whether	  the	  generation	  of	  the	  reports	  themselves	  is	  biased.	  That	  sort	  of	  bias	  is	  acutely	  problematic	  because	  it	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  eliminate	  than	  a	  theorist’s	  interpretive	  bias.	  Now	  that	  we	  have	  an	  account	  of	  the	  dimensions	  of	  reliability,	  we	  can	  examine	  whether	  phenomenological	  reports	  on	  social	  interactions	  are	  reliable,	  i.e.,	  whether	  they	  are	  consistent,	  accurate,	  and	  objective.	  Scientific	  data	  on	  this	  topic	  are	  very	  scarce.	  As	  of	  now,	  there	  is	  only	  one	  published	  scientific	  study	  on	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  social	  cognition,	  and	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it	  does	  not	  address	  the	  reliability	  of	  phenomenology	  (Bryant,	  Coffey,	  Povinelli,	  &	  Pruett	  Jr,	  2013).	  Thus,	  we	  must	  look	  elsewhere	  for	  evidence	  on	  the	  reliability	  of	  phenomenology	  of	  social	  cognition.	  The	  empirical	  literature	  on	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  other	  sorts	  of	  cognition	  is	  fairly	  well	  developed.	  Below	  I	  shall	  discuss	  the	  reliability	  of	  phenomenological	  reports	  in	  general	  and	  then	  turn	  to	  phenomenological	  claims	  about	  social	  cognition	  specifically.	  	  The	  general	  track	  record	  for	  phenomenological	  reports	  is	  fairly	  poor.	  An	  extensive	  empirical	  literature	  details	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  our	  phenomenological	  reports	  are	  unreliable.	  A	  thorough	  examination	  of	  that	  literature	  requires	  more	  space	  than	  I	  have	  here.	  I	  defer	  to	  Eric	  Schwitzgebel’s	  (2008)	  comprehensive	  review	  of	  the	  empirical	  study	  of	  phenomenology.	  Schwitzgebel	  details	  the	  various	  conditions	  under	  which	  phenomenology	  has	  been	  tested	  and	  concludes	  that	  phenomenology	  generally	  is	  unreliable.7	  Schwitzgebel’s	  review	  is	  thorough	  and	  broadly	  acceptable,	  though	  theorists	  who	  are	  sanguine	  about	  the	  prospects	  for	  phenomenology	  may	  draw	  a	  different	  conclusion	  from	  these	  data.	  Schwitzgebel	  contends	  that	  our	  phenomenological	  capacities	  fail	  in	  the	  following	  tasks.	  We	  fail	  at	  assessing	  the	  causes	  of	  our	  mental	  states	  and	  the	  processes	  underwriting	  them.	  Our	  judgments	  about	  non-­‐phenomenal	  mental	  states	  (e.g.,	  traits,	  motivations,	  and	  skills)	  are	  inaccurate	  and	  biased.	  Our	  judgments	  about	  our	  occurrent	  conscious	  experiences	  are	  unreliable	  when	  we	  are	  distracted,	  passionate,	  inattentive,	  self-­‐deceived,	  and	  pathologically	  deluded,	  and	  when	  we’re	  reflecting	  on	  minor	  matters,	  the	  past,	  the	  current	  moment,	  and	  where	  fine	  discrimination	  is	  required.	  We	  are	  ignorant	  and	  prone	  to	  error	  in	  basic	  phenomenological	  tasks,	  e.g.,	  reporting	  what	  we	  think	  and	  want.	  We	  
                                                7	  Schwitzgebel	  reviews	  the	  literature	  on	  introspection,	  but	  there	  is	  considerable	  overlap	  between	  introspection	  and	  phenomenology.	  He	  concludes	  that	  the	  method	  by	  which	  we	  normally	  reach	  judgments	  about	  our	  conscious	  experiences	  typically	  is	  unreliable.	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misjudge	  fundamental	  and	  pervasive	  aspects	  of	  our	  conscious	  experiences,	  e.g.,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  environmental	  cues,	  determining	  the	  emotion	  or	  sensation	  we	  are	  experiencing.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  expertise	  effects,	  i.e.,	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  reliability	  of	  our	  phenomenological	  reports	  improves	  with	  practice.	  Even	  experts	  on	  phenomenology	  profoundly	  disagree	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  phenomenological	  experience,	  e.g.,	  whether	  a	  thought	  has	  a	  distinctive	  phenomenology	  beyond	  the	  imagery	  invoked	  by	  thinking	  the	  thought	  (Schwitzgebel,	  2008).	  Schwitzgebel’s	  review	  suggests	  that	  phenomenology	  often	  is	  inconsistent,	  inaccurate,	  and	  biased.	  This	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  phenomenology	  always	  is	  unreliable	  for	  every	  task	  and	  under	  every	  condition.	  It	  is	  an	  open	  empirical	  question	  when,	  if	  ever,	  phenomenology	  is	  reliable.	  The	  studies	  Schwitzgebel	  reviews	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  social	  cognition.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  there	  is	  almost	  no	  empirical	  literature	  on	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  social	  cognition.	  Phenomenologists’	  claims	  result	  from	  their	  introspective	  examinations	  of	  their	  own	  experiences	  of	  social	  interactions.	  (Gallagher,	  2012;	  Zahavi,	  2011).	  This	  is	  problematic	  for	  several	  reasons.	  	  First,	  there	  is	  no	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  even	  expert	  phenomenologists	  are	  reliable	  about	  social	  cognition.	  When	  I	  ask	  philosophers	  to	  introspect	  on	  their	  phenomenological	  experience	  of	  social	  interactions,	  they	  report	  widely	  differing	  phenomenological	  experiences.	  Some	  report	  that	  they	  almost	  never	  think	  about	  others’	  mental	  states,	  and	  others	  report	  that	  they	  frequently	  think	  about	  others’	  mental	  states.	  Presumably	  similar	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social	  cognitive	  processes	  are	  operating	  in	  these	  cases,	  yet	  phenomenological	  reports	  differ	  drastically.8	  Second,	  introspection	  notoriously	  is	  unreliable	  when	  one	  is	  introspecting	  past	  experiences	  and	  forming	  generalizations	  about	  one’s	  experiences.	  And	  this	  is	  exactly	  what	  phenomenologists	  are	  doing	  when	  they	  generate	  claims	  about	  their	  phenomenology	  of	  social	  interactions.	  	  Third,	  responses	  to	  phenomenological	  questions	  inherently	  are	  biased;	  they	  always	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  reporting	  bias.	  As	  Elizabeth	  Irvine	  observes,	  “First	  person	  reports	  are	  the	  products	  of	  decision	  making	  about	  whether	  a	  particular	  stimulus	  strength	  warrants	  a	  particular	  response	  in	  a	  given	  context”	  (Irvine,	  2012,	  p.	  640).	  This	  feature	  of	  first-­‐person	  reports	  is	  particularly	  acute	  here	  because	  there	  is	  no	  objective	  measure	  against	  which	  we	  can	  compare	  phenomenological	  reports	  of	  social	  interactions.	  Although	  both	  behavioral	  and	  subjective	  reports	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  bias,	  with	  behavioral	  evidence	  we	  have	  some	  objective	  measures	  against	  which	  we	  can	  compare	  the	  behavioral	  evidence.	  Currently	  we	  have	  no	  objective	  measures	  for	  subjective	  phenomenological	  reports.	  We	  cannot	  eliminate	  or	  correct	  for	  biases,	  because	  we	  have	  no	  objective	  baseline	  for	  comparison.	  	  As	  Schwitzgebel’s	  review	  shows,	  phenomenology	  generally	  is	  unreliable.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  expect	  phenomenological	  reports	  of	  social	  interactions	  to	  be	  more	  accurate	  than	  the	  array	  of	  phenomenological	  reports	  reviewed.	  Moreover,	  given	  that	  phenomenological	  reports	  of	  social	  cognition	  primarily	  result	  from	  solitary	  theorists’	  introspective	  reports	  on	  past	  experiences,	  a	  method	  with	  well-­‐documented	  flaws,	  it	  seems	  that	  phenomenological	  
                                                8	  Like	  mindreading	  theorists,	  phenomenologists	  presuppose	  that,	  for	  most	  individuals,	  there	  are	  similar	  social	  cognitive	  processes	  operating.	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  phenomenological	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  TT	  and	  the	  ST	  are	  incorrect	  theories,	  not	  that	  they	  simply	  fail	  to	  describe	  their	  own	  phenomenological	  experience.	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reports	  of	  social	  interactions	  are	  just	  as	  subject	  to	  these	  reliability	  problems	  as	  other	  phenomenological	  reports.	  It	  is	  worth	  discussing	  the	  results	  of	  the	  one	  empirical	  study	  on	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  social	  cognition	  (Bryant	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  This	  study,	  by	  Lauren	  Bryant	  and	  colleagues,	  employs	  Descriptive	  Experience	  Sampling	  (DES)	  to	  investigate	  how	  often	  subjects	  consciously	  find	  themselves	  thinking	  about	  others’	  mental	  states.	  In	  the	  study,	  30	  undergraduate	  students	  each	  wear	  a	  beeper	  for	  10	  hours.	  The	  subjects	  are	  instructed	  to	  write	  down	  whatever	  they	  are	  thinking	  whenever	  the	  beeper	  goes	  off.	  This	  method	  allows	  researchers	  to	  randomly	  query	  subjects	  about	  their	  thoughts	  throughout	  the	  day.	  The	  reported	  thoughts	  are	  sorted	  into	  three	  categories:	  action-­‐related	  thoughts,	  mental	  state-­‐related	  thoughts,	  and	  miscellaneous	  thoughts.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  study	  are	  as	  follows:	  47%	  of	  the	  reported	  thoughts	  were	  about	  actions,	  32%	  were	  about	  mental	  states,	  and	  21%	  were	  miscellaneous	  thoughts.	  	  The	  result	  that	  32%	  of	  subjects’	  thoughts	  were	  about	  mental	  states	  does	  not	  sit	  well	  with	  phenomenologists’	  claim	  that	  we	  rarely	  engage	  in	  mindreading.9	  Nevertheless,	  this	  study	  has	  only	  limited	  significance	  for	  this	  discussion.	  First,	  mindreading	  proponents	  argue	  that	  much	  mindreading	  is	  subconscious.	  Even	  if	  the	  reports	  are	  completely	  reliable,	  they	  cannot	  tell	  us	  how	  often	  we	  engage	  in	  mindreading	  because	  they	  tell	  us	  nothing	  about	  subconscious	  processes.	  Second,	  the	  study	  reveals	  very	  little	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  phenomenology.	  This	  study	  does	  not	  address	  the	  consistency	  or	  accuracy	  of	  
                                                9	  Thinking	  about	  mental	  states	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  mindreading,	  which	  additionally	  involves	  the	  attribution	  of	  mental	  states.	  Phenomenologists	  argue	  that	  we	  are	  more	  immediately	  engaged	  in	  social	  interactions	  than	  mindreading	  theories	  indicate.	  We	  rarely	  take	  a	  third-­‐person	  perspective	  on	  mental	  states,	  they	  argue.	  The	  fact	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  this	  study,	  32%	  of	  subjects’	  thoughts	  are	  about	  mental	  states	  is	  in	  tension	  with	  this	  argument.	  	  
 22 
phenomenological	  reports.	  The	  DES	  methodology	  in	  principle	  can	  give	  us	  evidence	  about	  intrapersonal	  and	  interpersonal	  consistency	  (though	  this	  study	  does	  not),	  however	  the	  method	  cannot	  validate	  the	  accuracy	  of	  phenomenological	  reports.	  Third,	  and	  relatedly,	  the	  results	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  reporting	  bias	  that	  Irvine	  discusses.	  Thus,	  this	  study	  cannot	  help	  us	  resolve	  our	  question	  about	  the	  methodological	  role	  of	  phenomenology	  in	  social	  cognition	  debates.	  Nevertheless,	  additional	  DES	  studies	  on	  social	  cognition	  would	  be	  useful.	  This	  methodology	  is	  an	  enormous	  improvement	  over	  the	  current	  armchair	  method	  of	  generating	  phenomenological	  claims	  about	  social	  cognition.	  DES	  controls	  for	  some	  of	  the	  most	  problematic	  elements	  of	  the	  current	  method,	  e.g.,	  reflection	  on	  past	  experiences	  and	  forming	  generalizations	  about	  one’s	  experiences	  (Engelbert	  &	  Carruthers,	  2011;	  Hurlburt	  &	  Schwitzgebel,	  2007;	  Weisberg,	  2011).10	  In	  light	  of	  evidence	  about	  the	  general	  unreliability	  of	  phenomenology,	  however,	  we	  should	  treat	  the	  results	  of	  this	  and	  future	  DES	  studies	  with	  caution.	  We	  need	  not	  assume	  that	  the	  reported	  thoughts	  reliably	  reflect	  the	  actual	  experience.	  We	  should	  treat	  these	  phenomenological	  reports	  as	  extremely	  defeasible	  reports	  on	  what	  subjects	  believe	  themselves	  to	  be	  experiencing.	  
                                                10	  In	  addition	  to	  DES,	  think-­‐aloud	  tasks,	  which	  require	  subjects	  to	  verbally	  talk	  through	  their	  experiences,	  may	  be	  a	  useful	  addition	  to	  the	  empirical	  literature	  on	  social	  cognition.	  One	  difficulty	  with	  directed	  requests	  for	  verbal	  reports	  (such	  as	  in	  the	  standard	  false-­‐belief	  task)	  is	  that	  the	  expectation	  of	  delivering	  information	  to	  the	  experimenter	  alters	  the	  thought	  process	  itself,	  which	  affects	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  reports.	  A	  recent	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  think-­‐aloud	  studies	  suggests	  that	  the	  think-­‐aloud	  protocol	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  this	  reliability-­‐compromising	  effect	  (Fox,	  Ericsson,	  &	  Best,	  2011).	  Like	  DES,	  the	  think-­‐aloud	  protocol	  is	  incapable	  of	  directly	  shedding	  light	  on	  unconscious	  cognitive	  processes.	  Nevertheless,	  both	  methodologies	  would	  be	  welcome	  additions	  to	  the	  social	  cognition	  literature.	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Treating	  first-­‐person	  reports	  as	  a	  defeasible	  guide	  to	  subjects’	  experiences	  is	  not	  a	  revolutionary	  idea.	  It	  is,	  in	  fact,	  fairly	  commonplace,	  and	  there	  are	  many	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  one	  might	  develop	  the	  idea.	  For	  example,	  Daniel	  Dennett,	  Gualtiero	  Piccinini,	  and	  Alva	  Noë	  offer	  distinct	  accounts	  of	  how	  to	  take	  seriously	  subjects’	  phenomenological	  reports	  without	  assuming	  that	  what	  subjects	  report	  is	  accurate	  and	  unbiased	  (Dennett,	  2003;	  Noë,	  2007;	  Piccinini,	  2009).	  Whichever	  account	  one	  adopts,	  this	  seems	  like	  the	  most	  sensible	  option	  in	  light	  of	  the	  extensive	  evidence	  of	  the	  unreliability	  of	  phenomenology.	  A	  further	  advantage	  is	  that	  it	  avoids	  an	  objection	  to	  the	  unreliability	  argument	  mentioned	  earlier.	  Gallagher	  argues	  that	  generalizing	  the	  worry	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  phenomenology	  results	  in	  the	  unpalatable	  conclusion	  that	  phenomenology	  never	  helps	  us	  understand	  how	  our	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  work	  and	  we	  never	  should	  base	  our	  arguments	  on	  phenomenological	  considerations	  (Gallagher,	  2012,	  p.	  203).	  Adopting	  the	  perspective	  that	  phenomenological	  reports	  are	  defeasible	  guides	  to	  subjects’	  experiences	  avoids	  this	  conclusion.	  Phenomenological	  reports	  may	  be	  useful	  when	  they	  are	  understood	  appropriately	  even	  though	  they	  are	  extremely	  defeasible.	  	  There	  are	  several	  good	  reasons	  to	  adopt	  something	  like	  Dennett,	  Piccinini,	  or	  Noë’s	  account.	  Notice,	  though,	  to	  go	  this	  route	  is	  to	  give	  up	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  phenomenology	  plays	  a	  substantial	  methodological	  role	  in	  social	  cognition	  debates.	  Phenomenological	  reports	  are,	  on	  this	  view,	  frequently	  unreliable	  reports	  of	  what	  one	  takes	  oneself	  to	  be	  experiencing.	  That	  is	  not	  the	  sort	  of	  evidence	  that	  straightforwardly	  can	  confirm	  or	  disconfirm	  theories	  of	  social	  cognition.	  	  	  
5.	  The	  Relevance	  of	  Phenomenology	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  The	  case	  for	  phenomenology	  hangs	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  phenomenology	  to	  social	  cognition	  debates.	  On	  one	  hand,	  if	  phenomenology	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  relevant,	  we	  should	  regard	  the	  unreliability	  of	  phenomenology	  simply	  as	  a	  limitation	  of	  our	  current	  methodologies	  and	  continue	  to	  develop	  better	  methodologies.11	  Perhaps	  in	  the	  future	  we	  will	  figure	  out	  an	  experimental	  paradigm	  that	  controls	  for	  some	  of	  the	  difficulties	  with	  consistency,	  accuracy,	  and	  biased	  nature	  of	  phenomenological	  reports.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  phenomenology	  turns	  out	  not	  to	  be	  relevant	  to	  social	  cognition	  debates,	  surely	  that	  would	  be	  a	  decisive	  blow	  to	  the	  phenomenological	  approach.	  If	  phenomenological	  evidence	  is	  old,	  unreliable,	  and	  irrelevant,	  nothing	  justifies	  granting	  it	  a	  substantial	  methodological	  role	  in	  this	  debate.	  	  Mindreading	  proponents	  maintain	  that	  phenomenology	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  social	  cognition	  debates	  insofar	  as	  these	  debates	  are	  about	  the	  cognitive	  architecture	  and	  sub-­‐personal	  processes	  responsible	  for	  social	  cognition,	  and	  phenomenology	  cannot	  shed	  light	  on	  these	  issues	  (Carruthers,	  2009;	  Currie,	  2008;	  Herschbach,	  2008b;	  Jacob,	  2011;	  Spaulding,	  2010).	  Defending	  the	  relevance	  of	  phenomenology,	  phenomenologists	  point	  out	  that	  if	  it	  really	  were	  totally	  irrelevant	  to	  social	  cognition,	  our	  theorizing	  never	  could	  get	  off	  the	  ground	  (Gallagher,	  2001;	  Ratcliffe,	  2006;	  Zahavi,	  2011,	  p.	  555).	  In	  a	  recent	  articulation	  of	  this	  view,	  Gallagher	  argues,	  “It	  is	  not	  unusual	  for	  neuroscientists	  to	  appeal	  to	  personal	  
                                                11	  Phenomenology	  –	  first	  person	  reports	  of	  one’s	  conscious	  experiences	  –	  clearly	  is	  relevant	  for	  some	  areas	  of	  research.	  Phenomenology	  is	  the	  primary	  explanandum	  of	  theories	  of	  consciousness,	  and	  it	  is	  essential	  for	  investigating	  psychiatric	  conditions.	  For	  example,	  depression,	  schizophrenia,	  and	  synesthesia	  are	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  and	  clinically	  identified	  by	  specific	  kinds	  of	  phenomenological	  reports.	  Theories	  about	  consciousness,	  depression,	  schizophrenia,	  and	  synesthesia	  make	  predictions	  about	  occurrent	  conscious	  experiences,	  and	  thus	  phenomenology	  is	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  theorizing	  about	  these	  conditions.	  Theorists	  in	  these	  research	  areas	  must	  contend	  with	  the	  concerns	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  first-­‐person	  reports	  and	  work	  to	  find	  improved	  methodologies.	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level	  practices	  and	  phenomenological	  experiences	  in	  setting	  up	  their	  experiments,	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  the	  only	  way	  to	  define	  the	  explanandum	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  phenomenology.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  neuroscientist	  wants	  to	  study	  brain	  processes	  that	  correlate	  with	  empathy	  she	  needs	  to	  have	  something	  better	  than	  a	  wild	  guess	  about	  what	  the	  experience	  of	  empathy	  is	  and	  what	  behavioral	  situations	  might	  elicit	  it”	  (Gallagher,	  2012,	  pp.	  205-­‐206).	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  without	  phenomenology,	  we	  could	  not	  even	  begin	  to	  explain	  social	  cognition	  or	  assess	  the	  relevance	  of	  sub-­‐personal	  cognitive	  processes	  to	  social	  cognition.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  we	  must	  have	  some	  understanding	  of	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  social	  interactions	  in	  order	  to	  theorize	  about	  social	  cognition	  is	  true,	  but	  it	  sidesteps	  the	  real	  dispute.	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  section	  3,	  some	  basic	  phenomenological	  claims	  are	  and	  always	  have	  been	  implicit	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  mindreading	  theories.	  Mindreading	  theorists	  need	  not	  deny	  that	  we	  need	  some	  understanding	  of	  a	  typical	  experience	  of	  a	  social	  interaction	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  the	  explanandum.	  The	  real	  point	  of	  disagreement	  is	  whether	  phenomenology	  is	  relevant	  in	  a	  more	  substantial	  sense.	  Can	  phenomenology	  confirm	  or	  disconfirm	  hypotheses	  about	  social	  cognition?	  Put	  another	  way,	  do	  theories	  of	  social	  cognition	  make	  claims	  that	  are	  testable	  phenomenologically?	  	  Phenomenologists	  answer	  affirmatively.	  Gallagher	  states,	  “If	  I	  am	  constantly	  predicting	  and	  explaining	  the	  behavior	  of	  others,	  it	  would	  seem	  odd	  to	  claim	  that	  I’m	  not	  sometimes	  aware	  of	  it,	  especially,	  for	  example,	  when	  my	  predictions	  or	  explanations	  fail,	  that	  is,	  when	  I	  fail	  to	  understand	  the	  other	  person,	  which	  is	  not	  an	  infrequent	  event”	  (Gallagher,	  2012,	  p.	  207).	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Matthew	  Ratcliffe	  claims,	  “It	  could	  be	  added	  that,	  if	  theory	  and	  simulation	  are	  primarily	  about	  enabling	  prediction	  and	  explanation,	  the	  phenomenological	  absence	  of	  prediction	  and	  explanation	  also	  constitutes	  a	  case	  against	  the	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sub-­‐personal	  operation	  of	  [folk	  psychology]	  in	  the	  form	  of	  theory	  or	  simulation”	  (Ratcliffe,	  2006,	  p.	  36).	  	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  if	  we	  really	  were	  explaining	  and	  predicting	  behavior	  all	  the	  time	  as	  mindreading	  proponents	  argue,	  we	  should	  have	  some	  phenomenological	  experience	  of	  this.	  But,	  phenomenologists	  argue,	  a	  careful	  phenomenological	  analysis	  reveals	  that	  we	  are	  not	  constantly	  explaining	  and	  predicting	  behavior.	  According	  to	  this	  argument,	  phenomenology	  is	  relevant	  because	  mindreading	  theories	  predict	  phenomenological	  experiences	  (namely,	  explaining	  and	  predicting)	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have.	  	  The	  fundamental	  issue	  here	  is	  whether	  explanation	  and	  prediction	  exclusively	  are	  personal-­‐level	  processes	  of	  which	  we	  always	  are	  consciously	  aware.	  Gallagher	  explicitly	  maintains	  that	  they	  are.	  “Explanation	  (or	  theory)	  seems	  to	  mean	  (even	  in	  our	  everyday	  psychology)	  a	  process	  that	  involves	  reflective	  consciousness.	  The	  term	  ‘prediction’	  also	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  describe	  a	  reflective	  conscious	  act…	  ‘Explanation’	  and	  ‘prediction’	  are	  personal-­‐level	  terms”	  (Gallagher,	  2005,	  p.	  215).	  Phenomenologists	  maintain	  that	  mindreading	  theories	  entail	  that	  we	  often	  have	  certain	  kinds	  of	  conscious	  experiences,	  namely,	  that	  of	  explaining	  and	  predicting	  behavior.	  	  Phenomenology	  shows,	  however,	  that	  we	  rarely	  have	  such	  conscious	  experiences.	  Mindreading	  proponents,	  in	  contrast,	  use	  the	  terms	  “explanation”	  and	  “prediction”	  in	  a	  broader	  way.	  In	  mindreading	  theories,	  explanation	  and	  prediction	  also	  to	  refer	  to	  sub-­‐personal	  processes	  that	  are	  not	  consciously	  accessible	  (Herschbach,	  2008a;	  Jacob,	  2011;	  Spaulding,	  2010).	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  many	  of	  our	  social	  interactions	  consist	  in	  implicit	  mindreading,	  i.e.,	  subconsciously	  explaining	  and	  predicting	  targets’	  behavior	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  attributed	  mental	  states.	  	  
 27 
Phenomenologists	  are	  right	  to	  point	  out	  the	  peculiarity	  of	  subconscious	  explanation	  and	  prediction.	  This	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  a	  terminological	  issue.	  The	  terms	  “explanation”	  and	  “prediction”	  commonly	  are	  used	  to	  characterize	  mindreading,	  but	  these	  terms	  are	  problematic.	  They	  are	  carryovers	  from	  conceptualizing	  social	  cognition	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  literal	  
theory	  of	  mind.	  	  Decades	  ago,	  philosophers	  and	  psychologists	  studying	  social	  cognition	  argued	  that	  we	  understand	  others	  by	  employing	  a	  literal	  theory	  of	  mind,	  which	  involves	  folk	  psychological	  laws	  that	  connect	  mental	  states,	  unobservable	  theoretical	  entities,	  to	  behavior.	  Much	  of	  social	  cognition,	  it	  was	  argued,	  consists	  in	  employing	  these	  folk	  psychological	  laws,	  along	  with	  auxiliary	  assumptions	  about	  the	  relevant	  circumstances,	  to	  
deduce	  explanations	  and	  predictions	  of	  behavior.	  They	  argued	  that	  we	  use	  our	  theory	  of	  mind	  just	  like,	  for	  example,	  physicists	  use	  the	  theory	  of	  gravity	  to	  explain	  and	  predict	  the	  behavior	  of	  physical	  objects.	  Jerry	  Fodor,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  theory	  of	  mind	  explanations	  “are	  frequently	  seen	  to	  exhibit	  the	  ‘deductive	  structure’	  that	  is	  so	  characteristic	  of	  explanation	  in	  real	  science.	  There	  are	  two	  parts	  to	  this:	  the	  theory’s	  underlying	  generalizations	  are	  defined	  over	  unobservables,	  and	  they	  lead	  to	  its	  predictions	  by	  iterating	  and	  interacting	  rather	  than	  by	  being	  directly	  instantiated”	  (Fodor,	  1987,	  p.	  7).	  	  The	  conception	  of	  theory	  of	  mind	  described	  above	  has	  fallen	  out	  of	  favor,	  as	  has	  the	  Deductive-­‐Nomological	  model	  of	  scientific	  theorizing	  on	  which	  it	  is	  based.12	  Philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  abandoned	  the	  idea	  that	  all,	  or	  even	  most	  scientific	  theories	  consist	  in	  
                                                12	  Conceiving	  of	  theory	  of	  mind	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Deductive-­‐Nomological	  model	  is	  specific	  to	  traditional	  formulations	  of	  the	  TT,	  but	  generally	  conceiving	  of	  theory	  of	  mind	  in	  terms	  of	  scientific	  theorizing	  is	  neutral	  between	  the	  TT	  and	  the	  ST.	  Both	  the	  TT	  and	  the	  ST	  employ	  a	  kind	  of	  theorizing:	  a	  systematic	  process	  that	  results	  in	  explanations	  and	  predictions	  of	  some	  target	  phenomenon.	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collections	  of	  laws	  from	  which	  we	  deduce	  explanations	  and	  predictions.	  Similarly,	  most	  theorists	  studying	  social	  cognition,	  even	  theory	  theorists,	  have	  given	  up	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  social	  cognition	  literally	  involves	  applying	  folk	  psychological	  laws	  and	  deriving	  explanations	  and	  predictions	  from	  these	  laws.	  Contemporary	  theory	  theorists	  characterize	  our	  social	  cognition	  as	  an	  information	  rich,	  interpretive	  process,	  which	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  simulation	  theory’s	  information	  poor,	  simulational	  process.	  Thus,	  the	  Deductive	  Nomological	  model	  of	  theory	  of	  mind	  is	  outdated.	  Even	  the	  term	  “theory	  of	  mind”	  is	  becoming	  outdated.	  Because	  of	  its	  theoretical	  connotations,	  some	  theorists	  advocate	  using	  the	  term	  “mindreading”	  instead.	  The	  contours	  of	  the	  mindreading	  debate	  have	  shifted	  over	  the	  decades,	  and	  this	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  changing	  terminology.	  “Explanation”	  and	  “prediction”	  are	  terminological	  hangovers	  from	  the	  Deductive-­‐Nomological	  model	  of	  mindreading,	  and	  as	  such	  they	  should	  be	  retired	  as	  well.	  To	  avoid	  these	  terminological	  disputes	  about	  subconscious	  explanation	  and	  prediction,	  we	  need	  more	  appropriate	  terms	  to	  describe	  the	  cognitive	  processes	  involved	  in	  mindreading.	  Below	  I	  propose	  “interpretation”	  and	  “anticipation”	  as	  more	  appropriate	  and	  neutral	  terms	  for	  mindreading.	  These	  suggestions	  may	  or	  may	  not	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  the	  best	  alternatives,	  but	  it	  is	  past	  time	  to	  come	  up	  with	  new	  terminology	  for	  explanation	  and	  prediction.13	  	  A	  more	  fitting	  alternative	  to	  the	  term	  “explanation”	  is	  “interpretation.”	  Mindreading	  is	  interpretation	  that	  involves	  attributing	  mental	  states.	  Interpretation,	  as	  I	  use	  the	  term,	  is	  
                                                13	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  some	  theorists	  have	  urged	  a	  terminological	  shift	  to	  “online”	  and	  “offline”	  social	  cognition.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Herschbach	  (2008a),	  Dumontheil,	  Apperly,	  and	  Blakemore	  (2010),	  and	  Schilbach	  (2014).	  The	  online/offline	  distinction	  does	  not	  map	  exactly	  onto	  the	  distinction	  I	  make,	  though	  I	  think	  reconceptualizing	  social	  cognition	  in	  these	  terms	  is	  move	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	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the	  process	  of	  taking	  in	  information	  and	  selectively	  attuning	  to	  certain	  aspects	  of	  that	  information	  in	  order	  to	  model	  the	  target	  phenomenon.	  The	  kind	  of	  model	  involved	  here	  is	  abstract;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  physical	  entity	  or	  linguistic	  description.	  It	  may	  be	  a	  heuristic,	  stereotype,	  or	  prototype.	  Interpretation	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  error	  in	  two	  ways.	  The	  informational	  aspects	  to	  which	  one	  is	  attuned	  may	  not	  accurately	  represent	  the	  phenomena,	  and	  the	  imposed	  model	  may	  be	  a	  poor	  fit.	  There	  may	  not	  be	  a	  single	  best	  model	  for	  a	  particular	  phenomenon;	  nevertheless	  some	  models	  may	  be	  more	  appropriate	  given	  the	  pragmatic	  context.	  	  One	  can	  model	  a	  target	  phenomenon	  by	  way	  of	  simulation,	  which	  proceeds	  roughly	  as	  stipulated	  by	  the	  ST	  of	  mindreading.	  One	  observes	  a	  target’s	  behavior,	  attunes	  to	  certain	  aspects	  of	  that	  behavior,	  and	  mentally	  simulates	  engaging	  in	  that	  behavior.	  The	  result	  is	  an	  attribution	  of	  mental	  states	  that	  could	  have	  caused	  the	  behavior.	  Simulational	  modeling	  is	  one	  way	  to	  interpret	  a	  target	  phenomenon.	  Alternatively,	  one	  can	  model	  a	  target	  phenomenon	  by	  way	  of	  a	  theoretical	  process.	  The	  theoretical	  process	  could	  be	  spelled	  out	  in	  numerous	  ways,	  as	  various	  models	  of	  theorizing	  have	  emerged	  since	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Deductive	  Nomological	  model.	  Below	  I	  describe	  one	  promising	  prospect	  for	  theoretical	  modeling.	  Heidi	  Maibom	  (2007,	  2009)	  distinguishes	  three	  types	  of	  models	  that	  are	  useful	  for	  understanding	  social	  interpretation	  as	  theoretical	  modeling:	  models	  for	  goal-­‐directed	  behavior,	  social	  models,	  and	  folk	  psychological	  models.	  Theoretical	  models	  specify	  a	  general	  structure,	  relations,	  and	  properties	  of	  some	  phenomenon.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  social	  model	  for	  a	  university.	  The	  university	  model	  represents	  the	  social	  structure	  of	  a	  university	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  overall	  purpose	  (providing	  postgraduate	  education	  to	  adults)	  and	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circumscribes	  individuals’	  roles	  within	  the	  university	  (professors,	  students,	  administrators).	  Facility	  with	  the	  university	  model	  helps	  one	  understand	  behavior	  of	  a	  university	  and	  the	  individuals	  in	  the	  university,	  even	  if	  one	  knows	  little	  about	  the	  particular	  institution	  to	  which	  the	  model	  is	  applied.	  On	  this	  view,	  interpretation	  consists	  in	  constructing	  and	  applying	  a	  given	  model	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  similarities	  between	  the	  informational	  aspects	  to	  which	  one	  is	  attuned	  and	  that	  model.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  mindreading,	  one	  constructs	  and	  applies	  what	  Maibom	  calls	  folk	  psychological	  models.	  There	  is	  a	  single,	  core	  folk	  psychological	  model,	  which	  consists	  in	  the	  distinction	  between	  beliefs	  and	  desires,	  the	  idea	  of	  sensory	  input	  and	  behavioral	  output,	  and	  the	  dependence	  of	  action	  on	  perceptions,	  memories,	  goals,	  etc.	  The	  core	  folk	  psychological	  model	  can	  be	  elaborated,	  updated,	  and	  altered	  in	  various	  ways,	  and	  we	  can	  build	  model	  psychological	  profiles	  for	  particular	  social	  roles,	  groups	  of	  people,	  or	  individuals.	  On	  this	  account	  of	  interpretation,	  theoretical	  modeling	  involves	  attuning	  to	  certain	  aspects	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  (what	  the	  target	  is	  saying	  and	  doing,	  her	  recent	  history,	  personality,	  etc.)	  and	  applying	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  a	  folk	  psychological	  model	  that	  resembles	  the	  target	  phenomenon.	  For	  both	  simulational	  modeling	  and	  theoretical	  modeling,	  it	  takes	  practice	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  models,	  i.e.,	  to	  recognize	  patterns	  in	  behavior	  and	  apply	  appropriate	  models	  to	  the	  phenomena.	  Interpretation	  ranges	  from	  reflectively	  conscious	  processes	  to	  spontaneous	  non-­‐conscious	  processes.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  model	  may	  be	  explicit	  and	  deployed	  deliberately,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  scientific	  interpretation,	  but	  it	  need	  not	  be.	  The	  model	  may	  be	  implicit,	  and	  the	  agent	  using	  it	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  describe	  it	  in	  any	  great	  detail,	  and	  thus	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  articulate	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  model	  and	  the	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target	  phenomenon.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  result	  of	  the	  interpretation	  is	  that	  the	  agent	  simply	  sees	  the	  target	  phenomenon	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  more	  familiar	  model.	  Finally,	  mindreading	  interpretation	  involves	  modeling	  behavior	  in	  terms	  of	  mental	  states.	  These	  may	  be	  propositional	  attitudes,	  such	  as	  beliefs	  and	  desires,	  or	  non-­‐propositional	  attitudes,	  such	  as	  loving,	  fearing,	  hating,	  and	  other	  intentional	  states,	  such	  as	  seeing	  and	  hearing.14	  	  So	  much	  for	  interpretation.	  In	  place	  of	  “prediction”	  I	  suggest	  we	  use	  the	  term	  “anticipation.”	  For	  the	  version	  of	  TT	  described	  above,	  anticipation	  is	  based	  on	  theoretical	  modeling.	  A	  particular	  folk	  psychological	  model	  will	  involve	  certain	  behavioral	  expectations.	  For	  example,	  applying	  the	  model	  irate	  customer	  to	  a	  fellow	  patron	  allows	  one	  to	  anticipate	  certain	  kinds	  of	  behavior	  in	  a	  target,	  e.g.,	  raising	  his	  voice,	  demanding	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  manager,	  etc.	  Anticipation	  for	  ST	  is	  based	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  simulational	  model.	  I	  mentally	  simulate	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  target	  behavior,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  I	  attribute	  mental	  states	  to	  the	  target.	  I	  mentally	  simulate	  what	  I	  would	  do	  if	  I	  had	  those	  mental	  states,	  and	  on	  that	  basis	  anticipate	  that	  the	  target	  will	  do	  as	  I	  would	  in	  my	  simulational	  model.	  Anticipation	  does	  not	  have	  the	  infelicitous	  connotation	  of	  being	  an	  exclusively	  conscious,	  deliberative	  process,	  like	  prediction	  does.	  One	  can	  subconsciously	  anticipate	  or	  consciously,	  deliberately	  anticipate.	  Anticipation	  better	  reflects	  the	  interactive	  nature	  of	  social	  cognition,	  than	  prediction.	  Prediction	  connotes	  a	  removed,	  scientific	  perspective,	  whereas	  anticipation	  has	  no	  such	  connotation.	  Anticipation	  more	  accurately	  describes	  some	  of	  the	  newer	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  mindreading.	  For	  example,	  many	  developmental	  
                                                14	  Gallagher	  (2007)	  argues,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  critiquing	  the	  ST,	  that	  using	  a	  model	  is	  an	  exclusively	  personal-­‐level	  phenomenon.	  As	  my	  comments	  in	  the	  main	  text	  indicate,	  I	  think	  this	  is	  a	  mistake.	  See	  Herschbach	  (2008b,	  pp.	  228-­‐232)	  for	  further	  defense	  of	  sub-­‐personal	  modeling.	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psychology	  studies	  on	  social	  cognition	  involve	  anticipatory	  looking,	  violation	  of	  expectation,	  and	  active	  helping	  conditions.15	  These	  tests	  measure	  whether	  young	  children	  spontaneously	  help	  a	  target	  with	  an	  uncompleted	  task,	  where	  infants	  look	  when	  observing	  a	  target’s	  goal-­‐directed	  behavior,	  and	  how	  long	  they	  look	  at	  novel,	  unexpected	  visual	  stimuli.	  It	  is	  more	  natural	  to	  describe	  these	  experimental	  paradigms	  as	  testing	  infants’	  and	  children’s	  ability	  to	  anticipate	  a	  target’s	  behavior.	  	  “Anticipation”	  and	  “interpretation”	  are	  improvements	  over	  “prediction”	  and	  “explanation”	  in	  three	  ways.	  First,	  anticipation	  and	  interpretation	  are	  neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  TT	  and	  the	  ST.	  Whereas	  theory	  of	  mind	  talk,	  including	  the	  associated	  explanation	  and	  prediction	  terminology,	  has	  distinct	  TT	  connotations,	  these	  terms	  are	  neutral.	  Interpretation	  may	  involve	  simulational	  modeling	  or	  theoretical	  modeling,	  and	  anticipation	  does	  not	  presuppose	  one	  view	  or	  the	  other.	  	  Second,	  adopting	  this	  terminology	  preempts	  a	  misguided	  objection	  to	  mindreading.	  Some	  critics	  argue	  that	  mindreading	  theories	  regard	  subjects	  as	  mere	  spectators	  in	  social	  interactions,	  but	  phenomenological	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  we	  are	  participants	  in	  rather	  than	  spectators	  of	  social	  interactions	  (Hutto,	  2008,	  pp.	  1-­‐22).	  Unlike	  explanation	  and	  prediction,	  interpretation	  and	  anticipation	  do	  not	  give	  the	  impression	  that	  agents	  are	  spectators	  rather	  than	  interacting	  agents.	  Players	  on	  a	  football	  field,	  for	  example,	  are	  paradigmatic	  interacting	  agents,	  not	  mere	  spectators,	  and	  it	  seems	  perfectly	  natural	  to	  describe	  the	  players	  as	  interpreting	  their	  opponents’	  movements	  and	  anticipating	  what	  they	  will	  do	  next.	  	  
                                                15	  See	  Thompson	  (2012)	  for	  a	  review	  of	  this	  literature.	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  Third,	  and	  most	  pertinent	  to	  the	  debate	  here,	  “anticipation”	  and	  “interpretation”	  do	  not	  automatically	  render	  subconscious	  mindreading	  conceptually	  suspicious.	  Recall	  that	  phenomenologists	  argue	  that	  explanation	  and	  prediction	  by	  definition	  involve	  reflective	  consciousness	  (Gallagher,	  2005;	  Ratcliffe,	  2006;	  Zahavi,	  2011).	  Whether	  or	  not	  that	  is	  correct,	  it	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  interpretation	  and	  anticipation	  that	  they	  involve	  conscious	  deliberation.	  Interpretation	  and	  anticipation	  may	  be	  subconscious	  processes.	  Moreover,	  they	  may	  involve	  propositional	  attitudes,	  non-­‐propositional	  attitudes,	  or	  other	  intentional	  mental	  states,	  which	  mitigates	  the	  concern	  that	  mindreading	  is	  too	  focused	  on	  propositional	  attitudes	  like	  belief	  and	  desire.	  Interpretation	  and	  anticipation	  plausibly	  allow	  flexibility	  in	  the	  process	  and	  content	  of	  mindreading,	  whereas	  explanation	  and	  prediction	  do	  not.	  In	  sum,	  the	  interpretation	  and	  anticipation	  terminology	  better	  reflects	  both	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  mindreading	  and	  should	  be	  adopted	  as	  replacements	  for	  “explanation”	  and	  “prediction.”	  Recall	  that	  phenomenology-­‐based	  criticisms	  of	  mindreading	  are	  prefaced	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  explanation	  and	  prediction	  exclusively	  are	  conscious,	  personal-­‐level	  psychological	  processes,	  and	  phenomenology	  shows	  that	  we	  rarely	  explain	  and	  predict	  behavior	  (Fuchs,	  2012;	  Gallagher,	  2012;	  Ratcliffe,	  2006;	  Zahavi,	  2011).	  If,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  interpretation	  and	  anticipation	  are	  suitable	  substitutes	  for	  explanation	  and	  prediction,	  and	  interpretation	  and	  anticipation	  can	  be	  subconscious,	  then	  the	  phenomenological	  objection	  loses	  its	  force.	  Phenomenology	  may	  reveal	  whether	  conscious	  interpretation	  and	  anticipation	  are	  occurring,	  but	  it	  cannot	  tell	  us	  whether	  subconscious	  interpretation	  and	  anticipation	  are	  occurring.	  Given	  that	  mindreading	  theorists	  hold	  that	  much	  of	  social	  cognition	  consists	  in	  subconscious	  interpretation	  and	  anticipation,	  the	  relevance	  of	  phenomenology	  is	  limited.	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Mindreading	  theories	  generally	  do	  not	  make	  claims	  that	  are	  testable	  phenomenologically,	  however	  there	  is	  one	  specific	  area	  of	  social	  cognition	  that	  is	  an	  exception.	  Claims	  about	  empathy	  involve	  phenomenological	  commitments.	  There	  is	  much	  debate	  over	  what	  empathy	  is,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  cognitively	  mediated,	  its	  epistemic	  role	  in	  understanding	  other	  minds,	  and	  how	  it	  is	  realized	  in	  the	  brain.	  The	  aspect	  of	  empathy	  that	  concerns	  us	  here	  is	  the	  similarity	  between	  a	  target’s	  and	  a	  subject’s	  affective	  state.	  If	  A	  empathizes	  with	  B,	  it	  follows	  that	  A	  and	  B	  consciously	  experience	  a	  particular	  affect.	  Thus,	  claims	  about	  empathy	  are	  testable,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  by	  phenomenology.	  To	  take	  simplistic	  example,	  if	  phenomenological	  analysis	  reveals	  that	  I	  am	  in	  affective	  state	  X	  but	  you	  in	  fact	  are	  in	  dissimilar	  affective	  state	  Y,	  then	  it	  follows	  that	  I	  am	  not	  empathizing	  with	  you.	  	   Empathy	  is	  not	  an	  objection	  to	  the	  thesis	  advanced	  in	  this	  paper.	  The	  study	  of	  empathy	  as	  a	  social	  cognitive	  capacity	  need	  not	  be	  focused	  primarily	  on	  phenomenological	  aspects.	  It	  may	  instead	  focus	  on	  the	  isomorphism	  between	  a	  subject	  and	  a	  target.	  At	  most,	  empathy	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  phenomenology	  weakly	  constrains	  theories	  about	  social	  cognition.	  This	  requires	  that	  phenomenologically	  testable	  claims	  about	  empathy	  are	  not	  false.	  Social	  cognition	  theories	  aim	  to	  describe	  empathy	  and	  related	  concepts,	  such	  as	  sympathy	  and	  emotional	  contagion,	  and	  this	  necessarily	  involves	  describing	  some	  aspects	  of	  our	  phenomenology.	  Theories	  satisfy	  the	  weak	  constraint	  so	  long	  as	  they	  do	  not	  involve	  false	  predictions	  about	  our	  phenomenology.	  This	  does	  not	  show	  that	  theories	  of	  social	  cognition	  generally	  ought	  to	  explain	  and	  be	  empirically	  supported	  by	  phenomenological	  evidence.	  	  	  
 35 





                                                
16 I am grateful to Mitchell Herschbach, Michael Roche, Robert Thompson and Michael Wilby 
for their insightful, constructive comments on previous drafts of this paper. Thanks also to the 
participants at the TESIS Instituting Minds conference in London 2014, where I presented this 
paper. Finally, thanks to the anonymous referee at this journal. This paper benefited greatly from 
all the feedback I received from these people.   
 36 
References:	  	  
Blackburn, S. (1992). Theory, observation and drama. Mind & Language, 7(1‐2), 187-230.  
Bryant, L., Coffey, A., Povinelli, D. J., & Pruett Jr, J. R. (2013). Theory of Mind experience 
sampling in typical adults. Consciousness and Cognition, 22(3), 697-707.  
Carruthers, P. (2009). How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and 
metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(2), 1-18.  
Currie, G. (2008). Some ways to understand people. Philosophical Explorations, 11(3), 211-218.  
Davies, M., & Stone, T. (1995). Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making. Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences, 6(4), 485-507.  
Dennett, D. (2003). Who's On First? Heterophenomenology Explained. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 10(9-10), 19-30.  
Dumontheil, I., Apperly, I. A., & Blakemore, S. J. (2010). Online usage of theory of mind 
continues to develop in late adolescence. Developmental Science, 13(2), 331-338.  
Engelbert, M., & Carruthers, P. (2011). Descriptive Experience Sampling: What is it good for? 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(1), 130-149.  
Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Fox, M. C., Ericsson, K. A., & Best, R. (2011). Do procedures for verbal reporting of thinking 
have to be reactive? A meta-analysis and recommendations for best reporting methods. 
Psychological Bulletin, 137(2), 316.  
Fuchs, T. (2012). The phenomenology and development of social perspectives. Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences, 1-29.  
Gallagher, S. (2001). The practice of mind. Theory, simulation or primary interaction? Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 8(5-7), 83-108.  
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind: Oxford University Press, USA. 
Gallagher, S. (2007). Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience, 2(3-4), 353-365.  
Gallagher, S. (2012). In defense of phenomenological approaches to social cognition: Interacting 
with the critics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(2), 187-212.  
Goldman, A. I. (1997). Science, publicity, and consciousness. Philosophy of Science, 525-545.  
Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of 
Mindreading (Philosophy of Mind): Oxford University Press, USA. 
Gordon, R. M. (1992). The Simulation Theory: Objections and Misconceptions. Mind & 
Language, 7(1-2), 11-34.  
Herschbach, M. (2008a). False-belief understanding and the phenomenological critics of folk 
psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, 33-56.  
Herschbach, M. (2008b). Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social 
perception. Philosophical Explorations, 11(3), 223-235.  
Hitchcock, C., & Sober, E. (2004). Prediction versus accommodation and the risk of overfitting. 
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(1), 1-34.  
Hurlburt, R. T., & Schwitzgebel, E. (2007). Describing Inner Experience?: Proponent Meets 
Skeptic: MIT Press. 
Hutto, D. D. (2008). Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding 
Reasons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 37 
Jacob, P. (2011). The direct-perception model of empathy: A critique. Review of Philosophy and 
Psychology, 2(3), 519-540.  
Maibom, H. (2007). Social systems. Philosophical Psychology, 20(5), 557.  
Maibom, H. (2009). In Defence of (Model) Theory Theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
16, 6(8), 360-378.  
Nisbett, R., & Wilson, T. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental 
processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231-259.  
Noë, A. (2007). The critique of pure phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences, 6(1-2), 231-245.  
Piccinini, G. (2009). First-person data, publicity, and self-measurement. Philosophers’ Imprint, 
9(9), 1-16.  
Ratcliffe, M. (2006). 'Folk psychology’ is not folk psychology. Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences, 5(1), 31-52.  
Schilbach, L. (2014). On the relationship of online and offline social cognition. Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 8.  
Schwitzgebel, E. (2008). The unreliability of naive introspection. Philosophical Review, 117(2), 
245-273.  
Spaulding, S. (2010). Embodied cognition and mindreading. Mind & Language, 25(1), 119-140.  
Spaulding, S. (forthcoming). On direct social perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1-32.  
Thompson, J. (2012). Implicit mindreading and embodied cognition. Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences, 11(4), 449-466.  
Weisberg, J. (2011). Introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(1), 7-20.  
Zahavi, D. (2011). Empathy and direct social perception: A phenomenological proposal. Review 
of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(3), 541-558.  
 	  
